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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. Investigation by Florida Bar. The Florida Bar,
upon being alerted to alleged corrupt practices of an attorney, which be-
came the subject of formal charges, was authorized, both by the Integra-
tion Rule (31 F.S.A. Integration Rule of Florida Bar, art. XI.) and prior
court decisions, to initiate the investigation conducted in this case regard-
less of whether the conduct complained of was set down in affidavit form.'
School Districts. Several school districts in a county were merged into
a single school district, retaining the identity of the former districts for
purposes of assuring the payment of its bonds. The consolidated district
board had the authority to issuc refunding bonds on behalf of the old
districts.
2
AiENcy. Indication of power. A purchaser brought suit against the
vendor for specific perfornance of a contract for sale of realty, executed
in the vendor's name by his duly appointed agent. The Supreme Court
held that the duly authorized agent could bind his principal by executing
a contract in the name of the principal alone, without any indication of
the fact of agency upon the face of the instrument.3
ATTORNEYS. Right of intervention for fees. Where plaintiffs, without
knowledge and consent of defendants' attorney, settled the main action with
defendants and secured from them a release of any possible claim for dam-
ages for wrongful attachment, it was held that defendants' attorney did
not have the right to intervene in the main action (which was in contract)
and sue the plaintiff for attorney's fees due for services rendered in procur-
ing dissolution of the writ of attachment.4
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Due Process. Entry of a judgment against a
surety without notice under a statute providing for such entry on a for-
feited bail bond was not a denial of due process.5
*The Florida Supreme Court decided over two hundred cases during the reported
period from January 27, 1956, through May 18, 1956. These cases (excluding memoran.
dum opinions and others not of sufficient importance to note) are herein reported. In
addition, several federal cases interpretative of Florida law have been included. These
opinions are to be found in 85 So.2d 123 through 87 So.2d 497; 229 F.2d through
231 F.2d. (Feb. 1956-Apr. 1956); and 136 F.Supp. through 141 F.Supp. (Jan. 1956-
Apr. 1956).
This issue of the Quarterly Synopsis was written by Robert L. Shevin and edited
by Patrick McGrotty and Alan Brody.
1. State v. Grant, 85 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1956).
2. State v. Board of Public Instruction, 86 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1956).
3. Treister v. Pacetty, 85 So2d 605 (Fla. 1956).
4. Warshaw-Seattle, Inc. v. Clark, 85 So.Zd 623 (Fla. 1956).
5. Capitol Indemnity Insurance Company v. State, 86 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1956).
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Eminent Domain. Where the widening of a highway in front of the
premises on which plaintiff had constructed a building resulted in the de-
struction of the lateral support of the land, and caused the building to settle
and crack, the resultant damages were held not to be a "taking," within the
constitutional prohibition13 against the taking of private property without
the payment of compensation.7
Equal Protection. The constitutionality of a statute providing that, in
regard to an employee's recovery against a third party tort-feasor, the coin-
pensation carrier shall have a lieu for its pro rata share of such recovery
on the basis of such equitable distribution of the amount recovered as the
court determines, was attacked. It was held that the pro rata share based
upon an equitable distribution is available to all compensation carriers,
and the statute does not, therefore, deny equal protection.8
justiciable Issue, Dismissed. Where sufficient facts were alleged to
make a justiciable issue as to the constitutionality of a statute, it was error
to grant a motion to dismiss on the ground that the statute was a valid
exercise of police power."
Reapportionment. Where the Legislature passed a statute reapportion-
ing the house of representatives, 10 and this statute was attacked as ail abro-
gation of the constitutional provision requiring reapportionment of both
the house and the senate at the same time," the Supreme Court in sus-
taining the constitutionality of the statute held that it had no power to
order legislative action and hence could not conclude that the Legislature
had abused its discretion by enacting such a statute without also reapportion-
ing the senate.1'2
Right of Governor to seek re-election. In an election held pursuant
to a constitutional provision which contained no express or implied pro-
visions against his running for the succeeding full term,' 3 Governor Collins
was elected to fill an unexpired term as Governor following the death of
the incumbent. Subsequently, it was held that the Governor is eligible to
run for election to such full term notwithstanding a provision found else-
where in the Constitution 4 that a Governor shall not be eligible for re-
election to office for the next succeeding tenn."
CoN2RAc'is. Assignee's lien. The assignee of a conditional sales con-
tract covering an automobile, brought replevin action to recover possession
6. FLA. CONST. Art. XVI, § 29.
7. Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1956).
8. Insurance Company of Texas v. Rainey, 86 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1956).
9. Eelbeck Milling Company v. Mayo, 86 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1956).
10. Laws of Fla., c. 31378 (1955).
t1 FLA. CoNsT. Art. VII, § 3.
12. Brewer v. Grey, 86 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1956).
13. FLA. CONST. Art. IV, § 19.
14. FLA. CONST. Art. IV, § 2.
15. Ervin v. Collins, 85 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1956).
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of the automobile. The auttomobiC had been returned to the seller unknown
to the assignee who had filed papers for certificate of title with a first lien.
Subsequently, the automobile was conveyed to the appellant, the ultiute
l)uyer, who claimed to take free and clear of the assignee's lien. rhe court
held that the lien was valid against the appellant and replevin would lie
because one cannot claim a better title than lie, in fact, receives.'"
Notice of Defects. Failure on the part of homc owners to give written
notice of defects, as required by contract, was held to relieve the estate of
the deceased contractor from liability for repairs necessitated by defects in
the construction of a housing project in the absence of a showing that
the contractor was estopped from asserting or had vaived such contract
requirement. 7
Parol Evidence Rule. Parol evidence was held inadmissible to supple-
ment a lease agreement that was complete and unambiguous on the ground
that the intent expressed in a writing is controlling, and all other utterances
are immaterial with respect to the matters embraced. 18
CORPORATIONS. Contract. Where a non-profit corporation transferred
its property to another nonprofit corporation which assumed and agreed to
pay all the specified and unknown obligations of its predecessor, succeeding
corporation took all assets charged with the indebtedness owing for goods
sold and delivered to the predecessor corporation and was liable for such
indebtedness.10
CRIMINAL LAw. Appeal, proof of insolvency. Upon a showing that
he was the sole support of his wife and seven minor children and that be-
cause of a service-connected disability he was unable to do more than odd
jobs, an applicant was held to be entitled to adjudication that he was in-
solvent within the meaning of § 924.17, Florida Statutes 1955, which pro-
vides for payment of criminal appeal costs where the appellant is insolvent.20
Arrest. Wherc the appellant was charged with "removing, depositing,
or concealing" untaxed liquor 21 and his appeal was predicated on grounds
of unlawful arrest it was held since the state beverage supervisor smelled
the odor of fermenting mash at defendant's homc and defendant admitted
that he had a still and 100 barrels, the supervisor had reasonable ground to
believe that a felony has been, or was being committed by defendant; con-
sequently, the defendant's arrest without a warrant was lawful.
22
16. Dicks v. Colonial Finance Corporation, 85 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1956).
17. Eglin Village v. Barnett National Bank, 86 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1956).
18. Ramey v. Koons, 230 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1956).
19. Casements, Inc. v. Ruscoe, 85 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1956).
20, Anderson v. State, 85 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1956).
21. See FLA. STAT. § 562.32 (1955).
22. Pegueno v. State, 85 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1956)..
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Bail. A defendant who was charged with a capital offense was held
entitled to bail where the evidence did not clearly show that she was guilty
of the degree of homicide with which she was charged.23
Consolidated prosecutions. Where a defendant was convicted of mur-
dering two individuals in consolidated prosecutions, the court declared a
mistrial as based upon two points of law: First, it was error to order con-
solidation for trial of two prosecutions for murder where on one indict-
ment the defendant planned to offer only his own testimony, and on the
other, he planned to use other testimony, the use of which would result
in the forfeiture of his right to conclude the argument on the first charge;
and, secondly, if consolidation were proper, it was error to limit the de-
fendant to ten peremptory challenges, because he should have been allowed
twenty, the number to which he would have been entitled by statute24
had he been granted separate trials. 25
Evidence of prior crimes. While ordinarily, in a criminal prosecution,
evidence of other crimes perpetrated by a defendant is not admissible, such
testimony was properly allowed for the purpose of indicating defendant's
criminal course, even though it tended to prove the commission of an
unrelated crimeYi
Habeas Corpus: Grounds of uncertainty. Where a prisoner had been
sentenced to three years imprisonment on each of thirteen separate con-
victions and it was provided that each sentence subsequent to the first
was to expire three years from the date of incarceration, the court, upon
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the prisoner after his first sentence
expired, refused to release him upon the grounds that the sentences were
so vague and uncertain as to be of no force and effect.27
Habeas Corpus Premature Application. Under the provisions of a statute
that where a defendant has been convicted of two or more offenses charged
in the same indictment or information, terms of imprisonment shall be
served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that they be served
consecutively, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was dismissed as pre-
mature where the petitioner had not served either of his two year sentences
and there was no showing that the respondent, as prison custodian, would
not follow said provisions.28
Manslaughter. Testimony which showed that Appellant, with pistol
in hand, threatened the deceased and told him to leave, and that subse-
quently, the deceased grabbed for the gun, and that a struggle ensued in
23. State v. Kelly, 86 So.2d 166 (FIa. 1956).
24. FLA. STAT. § 913.08 (1955).
25. Meade v. State, 85 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1956).
26. Davis v. State, 87 So.2d 416 (Ma. 1956).
27. Wright v. Mayo, 85 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1956).
28. Hall v. Mayo, 85 So.2d 592 (Fla. 1956).
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which the fatal shot was fired, was sufficient to sustain a conviction of man-
slaughter within the meaning of §782.07 Florida Statutes 1955.",
Newly Discovered Evidence. In a prosecution for criminal robbery,
where the defendant maintained that a false robbery had been arranged
by the complaining witness to cover the disappearance of diamond rings,
an affidavit stating that the affiant saw the complaining witness and the
alleged robber and that the latter did not have the physical characteristics
of the defendant went to the merits of the case and entitled the defendant
to a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. 0
Pardon. The defendant, convicted of breaking and entering and sen-
tenced to 20 years imprisonment under the habitual offender statute,8'
appealed on the ground that he had been granted an unconditional pardon
with respect to the prior conviction. The court in reversing the judgment
and sentence ruled that a felony conviction for which the offender has
received a full and unconditional pardon cannot be counted as a prior
felony conviction under the provisions of the habitual offender law.32
Right to conclude. The court cannot deprive the defendant's counsel
of the right to deliver the closing argument when defendant has offered
no testimony save his own.33 Defendant's waiver of his opening address
does not divest him of this right guaranteed him by statute.34
Search and seizure. Where police officers, while arresting the defendant
for reckless driving, observed bolita tickets in his automobile and thereupon
arrested him for possession of bolita tickets, it was held that the gambling
material was admissible in a proceeding for the forfeiture of money allegedly
held for conducting a lottery, and that the search of the automobile and
defendant's person for the evidence relating to the lottery was reasonable
under the circumstances. 5
Separate counts. V/here a defendant was found guilty of two offenses
which were simply two facets of one transaction, it was error to sentence
him on each count.80
DomESTIc RELATIONS. Adoption-consent by fraud. A child custody
award made by the county probation officer and the sheriff without the
sanction of the county judge is without proper authority, 7 and where
evidence showed that the mother's consent to the child's adoption had been
29, Dolan v. State, 85 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1956).
30. Douth v. Steele, 85 So.2d 550 (Fla. 1956).
31. FLA. STAT. § 775.09 (1955),
32. Fields v. State, 85 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1956).
33. Wright v. State, 87 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1956).
34. FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1955).
35. State v. Simmons, 85 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1956).
36. Norwood v. State, 86 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1956).
37. FLA. STAT. § 415.04, 415.05 (1955).
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obtained by fraud the child was not even a proper subject for adoption
proceedings.3 1
Adoption-suitable parents. In a proceeding on the petition of a hus-
land and wife for the adoption of a child whom they had raised for two
years since his birth, where the chancellor decreed that due to the petitioner's
advanced age and his wife's activities as a Psychic Reader they were not
suitable persons to adopt the child, the Supreme Court held this evidence
failed to support the determination that adoption of the child by the peti-
tioners would not serve the child's best interestslD
Divorce-court's decree as bar. A New York court's decree which
granted husband a divorce on the ground of abandonment did not bar the
wife's action in Florida for a divorce on other grounds.
40
Divorce-court's jurisdiction. Where the Circuit Court had granted
a divorce and adjudicated the custody of minor children, its jurisdiction
continued for the reconsideration of the decree and for making such other
order concerning custody as the interests of the minors dictated, even
though the juvenile Court had adjudicated that the children were de-
pendent.
41
Divorce-lump sum payment of alimony. In lieu of alimony or other
claim for property settlement following divorce, a wife was awarded the
lump sum of $50,000 to be paid on or before two years from date of decree,
and the husband was required to pay divorced wife $125 per week until
such $50,000 payment was made. The Court held that the divorced husband
should not have been penalized during the period allowed him to arrange
his affairs so as to be able to make the lump sum payment, and therefore
all weekly payments paid to her as alimony together with interest accrued
thereon at 6% per annum would be credited against the lump sum award
when it was ultimately paid.42
Guardian and ward. The petitioner was lawfully appointed as guardian
and did not waive compensation nor breach his fiduciary duty. It was
held that lie was not a nominee or "dummy" even though he 'was but a
law clerk at the time he was nominated, because he was an officer of the
court by virtue of his appointment and therefore was entitled to be paid
for his services4
3
EQUITY. Contempt of injunctive order. The court issued an injunction
restraining the appellants from engaging in the fumigating business within
38. In Re Adoption of Shea, 86 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1956).
39. In Re Brown's Adoption, 85 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1956).
40. Horn v. Horn, 85 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1956).
41. State v. Rogers, 86 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1956).
42. Williams v. Williams, 85 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1956).
43. In Re Krecls Guardianship, 85 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1956).
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a certain area and appellants clearly violated the injunctive order by adver-
tising as fumigators and submitting bids on fumigating work. It was held
that the chancellor was devoid of power to extend the running of the
injunction, even as punishment for contempt, since his power to punish
for contempt is through compensatory fine. 44
Nuisance. \Where a day nursery was located in a neighborhood whcrc
there were traffic signal lights, filling stations, a four-lane highway, and a
railroad immediately to the rear, and the nursery was as well supervised as
it could be, the operation of the nursery would not be enjoined on the
ground that it was a "private nuisance." 45
EvIDENCE. Attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege does
not extend to the furnishing of names and addresses of persons who had
any knowledge concerning facts pertaining to the accident in ligitation.
Thus the plaintiff could not withhold this information on grounds that it
was the work product of his attorney.40
Cross-examination. In a grand larceny prosecution, cross-examination
with reference to periods that the defendant had spent in the guard house
was not proper, even though defendant testified he had been convicted
by a military court.4'
Dead Man's Statute. In an ejectment action48 testimony that decedent
had orally conveyed the premises to defendant should have been excluded
under the Dead Man's Statute. 4
9
Privileged Communications. Where a policy required the insurer to
defend the insured through its attorney, communications between insurer
and insured for the attorney's use were privileged communications and were
not subject to production under a subpoena duces tecum.50
Striking of Testimony. The striking of testimony which has a direct
bearing upon the credibility of the prosecution's witness and the appellant's
defense in general constituted reversible error.5'
Sufficiency of the Evidence. Questions of sufficiency of evidence will
not be considered by the Supreme Court unless it is first presented with
all the evidence that was before the trial court.52
INSURANCE. Exclusion Clause. A passenger hazard exclusion clause
contained in a fleet automobile liability policy could not be invoked to
defeat liability for negligence in the operation of any of the insured's trucks
44. National Exterminators v. Truly Nolen, Inc., 86 So2d 816 (Fla. 1956).
45. Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1956).
46. Dupree v. Better Way, 86 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1956).
47. Mead v. State, 86 So.2d 773 (Fla. 1956).
48. Seeba v. Bowden, 86 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1956).
49. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1955).
50. Vann v. State, 85 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1956).
51. Urga v. State, 85 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1956).
52. Nelson v. State, 85 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1956).
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other than the one in which the passenger was riding. Therefore the insurer
had a duty to defend an action against insured for the death of a hitch-
hiker riding in one of the insured's trucks which resulted from collision
with another of his trucks where the accident was caused by the negligent
operation of both."
Policy Agreement. The insured violated a policy agreement not to
take out additional insurance and was therefore precluded recovery on his
fire policy.54
LABOR RELATIONS. Collective bargaining. A bus company entered into
an agreement with independent contractors concerning janitorial services
at the terminal and the union claimed this to be in violation of their collec-
tive bargaining agreement with the company. In such a situation it was held
that the bus company could get relief against the union.
R'eviewability of Award. The court adopted federal law as governing
the reviewability of an award made by a board of adjustment in interpreting
a collective bargaining agreement negotiated under a duty to bargain im-
posed on air carriers and their employees. Under federal law, the board's
decision was final. Florida law makes unenforceable any agreement to
arbitrate future disputes and thus would strike down the provision in the
agreement that awards of the board shall be final and binding."6
LANDLORD AND TEN^rAN. Declaratory judgment. In an action for dam-
ages for the breach of a lease 57 any doubts resulting from disputed questions
of fact alone are not sufficient to make available to the litigants the provi-
sion of the Declaratory Judgments Act.58
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Authority to Pledge Tax Proceeds. Under
the cigarette tax statute59 which authorizes cities to spend the tax proceeds
for such state functions as are performed by municipal governments and
as otherwise performed by state and county governments outside the limits
of incorporated municipalities, a city could pledge the proceeds of the tax
to secure bonds issued to construct a city hail.6
Comprehensive Zoning. Where the city council enacts a comprehen-
size zoning code it is presumptively valid, and one who assails this code
mustcarry an extraordinary burden in proving its invalidity."'
Notice of Action. The plaintiff failed to comply substantially with the
Hallandale charter provision requiring, as condition precedent to action
53. Virginia Surety Company v. Russ, 86 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1956).
54. Hunter v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 86 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1956).
55. Amalgamated Association v. Greyhound Corp., 231 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1956).
56. Sigfred v. Pan American World Airways, 230 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1956).
57. Barrett v. Pickard, 85 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1956).
58. FLA. STAT. § 87.01 (1955).
59. FLA. STAT. § 210.03 (1955).
60. State of Florida v. City of Auburndale, 85 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1956).
6J. City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, 86 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1956).
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against the city for damages arising out of tort, notice to the city commis-
sion within 30 days after the injury. A divided court held the defect was
not cured by actual knowledge on the part of the city authorities or by
their opportunity to investigate irrespective of notice. 2
Public Policy. A city construction contract granted to an enterprise
in which a city commissioner is interested is against public policy, even
though the city commission is aware of the relationship and the dealings
are honest.63
NEGLIGENCE. Attractive Nuisance Doctrine-H-idden Danger. A rail-
road was held not liable under Florida's "attractive nuisance" doctrine for
the death of a child who was drowned in their abandoned well which was
being used by trespassing children as a swimming hole. The doctrine was
not applicable because the approach to the well did not constitute a hidden
danger of any kind.
4
Business Invitee-Duty. A business invitee who fails to apprehend a
dangerous condition is not contributorily negligent if there is no reason
to suspect the danger. 5
Duty- Proximate Causation. This is an action for a child's injuries,
sustained when he was struck by an automobile on defendant's (a super
market) parking lot, The fact that it is to be anticipated that children will
accompany their parents to the parking lot is insufficient to show any failure
of duty by the defendant which proximately caused or contributed to the
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Defendant's duty is only to use reasonable
care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition.6
Guest Statute-Dismounted Passenger. The Guest Statute was applied
to an accident which occurred when a passenger, who was being transported
by the motorist without compensation on a private road, stepped from the
automobile to open a gate and was struck when the automobile rolled for-
ward. Recovery was not allowed because the evidence was insufficient to
constitute gross negligence. 7
Guest Statute-Excessive Speed. A guest passenger's complaint that
the collision in which he sustained injuries was due to motorist's negligence
in driving, without excuse, at a speed of 70 miles per hour on a clear night
over a road which was straight up to the point of collision, 8 sufficiently
alleged gross negligence of the motorist as required by the guest statute.09
62. Buck v. City of Hallandale, 85 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1956).
63. Watson v. City of New Smyrna Beach, 85 So.2d 548 (Fla. 1956).
64. Howard v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 231 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1956).
65. Sagesser v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 230 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1956).
66. Jackson v. Pike, 87 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1956).
67. Fishback v. Yale, 85 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1956).
68. Faircloth v. Hill, 85 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1956).
69. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1955).
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Last Clear Chance in Railroad Cases. The justification for the doctrine
of last clear chance passes with the adoption of a comparative negligence
statute;70 therefore, the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply in cases
where the doctrine of comparative negligence is applicable.7
Sole Cause-New Trial. The sole proximate cause of an automobile-
train collision was the deceased's driving onto the tracks without exercising
any safety precautions. This was held to clearly establish the driver's
negligence and where the trial judge found the verdict contrary to the
weight of the evidence, it was his duty to grant a new trial. Such a decision
will not be disturbed on appeal, unless abuse of discretion is clearly shown?
2
Standard of Care. Regardless of whether a plaintiff who was injured
when she stepped on a grating covering a drain in bank's parking lot was
a business invitee or a mere licensee, it was nonetheless her duty to see
that which would be obvious to her upon the ordinary use of her senses
and to exercise a reasonable degree of care for her own safety. 3
PROCEDURE. Certiorari-Appellant Court. The circuit judge's action
in transferring a case to the Civil Court of Record for trial, could be
reviewed by certiorari. This is an exception to the general rule that the
judgment of an intermediate appellate court may not be reviewed by cer-
tiorari unless it disposes of the litigation.7 4
Chancellor's Findings. Where the Chancellor had heard all the testi-
mony and had observed all the witnesses his findings were entitled to the
highest degree of respect, and the appellate court would regard all factual
disputes with great circumspection.75
Defendant's Answer-Judging on the Pleadings. Where a court passes
upon a defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings after the de-
fendant has answered, all well pleaded material allegations of the complaint
and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom must be taken as true and
the inquiry is whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action by his
complaint. Since the test applied by the court is the same as if defendant
had made a motion to dismiss the complaint for "failure to state a cause
of action," the allegations of defendant's answer are of no avail to him
at a hearing on his own motion for a judgment or decree on the pleadings.76
Examination of the Record. Where the record on appeal in an auto-
mobile negligence case revealed that points raised on appeal were jury
questions and the record did not show that the jury was not advised or had
abused its discretion, the points raised were not substantial and the judg-
70. FLA. STAT. § 768.06 (1955.
71. Loftin v. Nolin, 86 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1956). Noted, 10 MIANt L.Q. 594 (1956).
72. Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 86 So.2d 792 (FIa. 1956).
73. Becksted v. Riverside Bank of Miami, 85 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1956).
74. Tantillo v. Miliman, 87 So.2d 413 (Fla. 1956).
75. Larkin v. Tsavaris, 85 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1956).
76. Reinhard v. Bliss, 85 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1956).
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ment was affirmed on motion. Inquiry under the Rules of Court contem-
plates only such an examination of the record as discloses that the judgment
appealed from is free from error. 7
Filing Assignments of Error. In a quiet title suit the defendant's
attack on probate court proceedings in the administration of the estate of
a decedent, by challenging the legal effect of the administrator's deed
conveying lots to the plaintiff, was improper as collateral. It was also held
that the defendants failed to perfect the appeal as required by the Supreme
Court Rules, in that assignments of error must be filed within ten days
after notice of appeal with the clerk of the court whose decree is appealed
from 78
Final Judgment-Right to Review. The Civil Court of Record awarded
a final summary judgment which was reversed on appeal by the Circuit
Court and remanded for further proceedings. This judgment had the effect
of setting aside the summary judgment and requiring the Civil Court of
Record to submit the issues to a jury for determination. Consequently,
there was no "final judgment" and nothing for the Supreme Court to
review.
7 0
Interest on Judgments Against State. A livestock owner who obtained
a judgment against the State Livestock Board was entitled to interest on
the judgment, even though the payment of interest by the state is not
expressly provided for by statute.80 The statute authorizing six per cent
interest on judgments applies to all judgments and makes no exception in
favor of the state.8'
Interlocutory Orders. Orders denying motions for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and for a directed verdict are interlocutory and there-
fore not appealable in the absence of specific statutory authority.8 2
Limitation of Actions. A complaint in a common law action was filed
with the clerk within the two year limitation period but the original process
was not placed in the hands of the sheriff until after the limitation period.
The court held that the action was barred by virtue of a statute8 3 providing
that the action is commenced for limitation purposes when process is de-
livered to the sheriff for service, notwithholding the general procedure rule
that an action is commenced when the complaint is filed.84
Moot Questions. The court would not decide complex litigation where
the appellant insisted that it was moot and when his adversary defended
the part attacked and had not challenged by cross assignments the part
it considered unfavorable. 5
77. Cooksey v. Zimmerman, 85 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1956).
78. Goldtrap v. Mancini, 86 So.2d 141 ( 96a. 195 ).
79. Feiner v. Sun Ray Drug Co. of Fla., 86 So.2d 891 (la. 1956).
80. FLA. STAT. § 55.03 (1955).
81. Florida Livestock Board v. Gladden, 86 So.2d 812 (Fla. 1956).
82. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Boone, 85 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1956).
83. FLA. STAT. § 95.01 (1955).
84. Lundstrorn v. Lyon, 86 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1956).
85. Bahia Mar Caterers v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 85 So.2d 59i (Fla. 1956).
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New Trial-Falsified Testimony. The defendants presented affidavits
on a motion for new trial which tendcd to show that the plaintiff had
deliberately falsified testimony as to his earnings. It was held that the new
trial should be granted on the grounds of the newly discovered evidence.,,
Sixty Day Limitation. The trial court in an action against the maker
and the endorser of a note first entered a default judgment against the
endorser and later entered judgment against the maker. Both the maker
and the endorser appealed jointly but the endorser's appeal was not taken
within 60 days from entry of judgment against him. It was held that the
court did not acquire jurisdiction of the endorser's appeal.87
Testimony before Special Master. Where the testimony of witnesses
was taken before a special master and an order was entered reducing the
special master to the status of a trial examiner, the appellants were not
prejudiced because the witnesses whose testimony was favorable to them
were not before the Chancellor. The appellants were not deprived of an
opportunity to present such witnesses at the trial.88
Trial without Jury. The findings of a trial judge, sitting without a jury,
are entitled to the weight of a jury verdict. These conclusions will not be
disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the evidence.89
Unverified Averments. Where notice of appeal in a child support case
was not accompanied by a transcript of testimony, the reviewing court could
not reverse the chancellor's rulings on unverified averments of the petition.90
Voluminous Record. The only point for review was whether the lower
court committed error in granting a new trial, yet the Court was confronted
with 100 pages of brief, and 500 pages of record and exhibits. This imposes
an extra burden on the court and unnecessary expense to the litigant 1
REAL PROPERTY. Bona Fide Purchaser. Where a purchaser did not record
his agreement for purchase of the land but recorded a deed for the land
from himself to another and neither he nor his grantee were in possession
of the land, a subsequent purchaser was not put on notice of the first
purchaser's interest in the land and acquired a good title against the first
purchaser.9 2
Broker's Cause of Action. In an action brought by a real estate broker
against purchaser on the grounds that they had unjustly enriched them
selves at the expense of the broker, by fraudulently representing that the
broker was not instrumental in bringing about the transaction, it was held
86. Ogburn v. Murray, 86 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1956).
87. Fellowship Foundation, Inc. v. B. M. Soule, 85 So.2d 628 (Fla. 1956).
88. Stewart v. Mack, 86 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1956).
89. Chakford v. Strum, 87 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1956).
90. Connolly v. Connolly, 86 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1956).
91. Brinson Construction Co. v. Leach, 86 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1956).
92. Poladian v. Johnson, 85 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1956).
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that such a complaint does not state a cause of action in equity or at law
and petitioners should not have been required to answer.-
Enforcement of Use Restrictions. Use restrictions were placed on
certain land by a common grantor as part of a general scheme of developing
and improving the land owned by him. Such restrictions would be enforced
by a court of equity against a grantee who took title with notice of the
restrictions, without regard to the technicalities of law relating to convenants
running with the land.
9 4
Equitable Estoppel. The appellants questioned the validity of the ap-
pellee's title to submerged lands, subsequently filled, included in a grant made
by the appellants to the appellees where the original deed had vested in
the grantees the right to fill such submerged lands, but the grantees were
not authorized to 611 beyond the boundaries conveyed, and where in good
faith they filled beyond that included in the grant. It was held that after
years of acquiesence the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevented the appel-
lants from questioning the ownership of the land as enlarged and developed
by the grantees.9
Grantee's Right to Set Aside Easement. Grantee brings action for
rescission and cancellation of an alleged fraudulent agreement between his
grantor and the defendant whereby the latter acquired an easement across
the property. Whether the complaint was properly dismissed as redress
for fraud depends on a showing that the complaining party relied on false
representations to his injury, and hcre the grantee had acquired the property
with full knowledge of defendant's easement."6
Homstead Exemption. The Supreme Court was called upon to interpret
the constitutional provision that homestead exemption shall not extend to
improvements or buildings other than to the "residence and business house"
of the owner. 7 The court held that this was a flexible clause which should
be construed reasonably, depending on the occupation pursued by the
owner. Thus, where the husband died seised of an improved parcel of land
which, in addition to a family residence, contained a one-story cottage and
a two-story garage apartment which were used for rental purposes, the whole
parcel constituted the homestead. 8
Measuring Mesne Profits. The guardian of life tenants was entitled to
possession of the realty and mesne profits subject to the life tenancy. The
measure of the mesne profits recoverable from the remainderman was the
93. Borinsgy v. Cohen, 86 So.2d 814 (Fla. 1956).
94. Vetzel v. Brown, 86 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1956).
95. Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Claughton, 86 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1956).
96. Maling Corporation v. Ladan Corporation, 85 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1956).
97. FLA. CONST. Art. X, § 1.
98. Union Trust Co. v. Glunt, 85 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1956).
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value of the use and occupation of the land during the time the guardian
was wrongfully dcprived of possession Y1
Percolating Waters. In ain action to enjoin the county from pumping
large quantities of water for distribution and sale to the public from wells
on a small strip of land adjoining a much larger tract owned by plaintiff, it
was held that the complaint stated a cause of action since the owner's right
to draw percolating water from his land is restricted by reasonableness.'"0
Private Easements. Appellants seek to enjoin the subdivision and sale
of land which had been used for a golf course. The common grantor was
not estopped to deny that private easements in the golf course had been
created for the benefit of the surrounding property owners.1 '
Restrictive Covenant. In an action by a drive-in theater operator against
used-car lot operators to compel them to eliminate from their lots lighting
which was objectionable to the operation of the theater and to recover for
resulting damages, the evidence was held sufficient to establish that de-
fendants' lighting was such as to be "objectionable" within the meaning
of a restrictive covenant of defendants' lease from the parties' common
lessor.102
Tax Deed Limitations. A deed executed by the trustees of the internal
improvement fund pursuant to statute'0 3 was not subject to the limitations
imposed for the recovery of lands in possession of a tax deed bolder. 4
STATE GOVERNMEN'T. Appointment of Judges-Jurisdictional Basis. The
Civil and Criminal Court of Record of Pinellas County has broader jurisdic-
tion than the Civil Court of Record of Dade County. Thus it was held that
the Judge of the Civil Court of Record of Dade County could not be
assigned to try a case in the Civil and Criminal Court of Record of Pinellas
County, but the Governor could, however, designate a Circuit Court judge
to hear the cause.T'
Appointment of Judges-Unexpired Term. The resignation of the
Judge of the Court of Crimes of Dade County, who was appointed by the
Governor for a four year term, did not create a vacancy to be filled at the
1956 election; hence, the Governor properly appointed a successor for the
unexpired portion of the term. 06
Circuit Court Judge's Power to Disqualify. The appellant brought suit
for determination that a particular judge was disqualified from hearing ally
99. Kany v. Becks, 85 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1956).
100. Koch v. Wick, 87 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1956).
101. Burnharn v. Davis Islands, Inc., 87 So2d 97 (Fla. 1956).
102. Grentner v. Lejeune Auto Theater, 85 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1956).
103. FL, STAT. § 192.38 (1955).
104. Newinons v. Lake Worth Drainage District, 87 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1956).
105. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 86 So.2d 158 (FIa. 1956).
106. Klein v. Schulz, 87 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1956).
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cases where he was involved as attorney, on grounds of the judge's prejudice
against him. The action was dismissed and subsequently affirmed. A Circuit
Court judge has no power to determine that another judge is disqualified
by prejudice from hearing a case, and the Supreme Court can not order
the Circuit Court judge to do so. The attorney's remedy is under the statute
providing for the disqualification of judges. 107
Disqualification Proceedings. Where the Governor individually was a
litigant, a question arose as to possible bias on the part of three Justices of
the Supreme Court in favor of the Governor, based on facts that one
justice's family and the governor's family were close, intimate and personal
friends and two other justices were appointed to office by the governor and
were personal and political friends of the governor. It was held that these
facts were not sufficient to constitute a legal basis for disqualification.'l
STATUTORY CONsTRU-TIONq. Advertisement Restrictions-Alcoholic Bev-
erage Retailers. The "tied house evil" statute prohibits a manufacturer or
distributor from furnishing to licensed retailers of alcoholic beverages, any
outside sign, etc., so as to remove the retailer from financial or business
obligations to the manufacturer or distributor. Such section does not pro-
hibit, per se, the location on the retailer's premises of an outside sign
advertising alcoholic beverages where the lease from the retailer to the
advertising company has been entered into in good faith.109
Constitutionality-Qualifying Date. A Section of a General Law which
fails to operate uniformly throughout the state is unocnstitutional and
invalid unless it contains a classification predicted on a reasonable basis.
Sec. 3 of Ch. 29936 was held unconstitutional because it unreasonably
excluded several large counties from the provisions of the Act setting the
definite qualifying date for elective offices. It was further held that it is
not necessary to declare the entire Act invalid even though the Act contains
no severability clause."10
Foreign Courts Decisions-Similar Statute. The decisions of courts of
a foreign state were especially applicable where a city ordinance, alleged to
have been violated, was apparently copied from a penal statute of the
foreign state.'
Special Improvements without Consent. An act authorizing county
boards of public instruction to discharge encumbrances on school proper-
ties for special or local assessments for streets and sidewalk improvements
does not require the boards to use these funds to pay for special improve-
ments without the board's consent or approval. 112
107. Ginsberg v. Holt, 86 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1956).
108. Ervin v. Collins, 85 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1956).
109. Hunter v. McKnight, 86 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1956).
110. State v. Newell, 85 So.2d 124 (Fla. 1956).
111. Maclow Corp. v. City of Miami Beach, 85 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1956).
112. Board of Public Instruction v. City of Jacksonville, 86 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1956).
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Qualifications for Pharmacy Examination. Iln anl action to construe
rights under a statute'' 3 setting forth qualifications of applicants for examina-
tion by the Board of Pharmacy, petitioner claimed that due to the fact
that a period was placed at the end of the contents of subparagraph (b),
the subparagraphs (b, c, d) were alternative and not cumulative. The court,
in carrying out legislative intent, held that the subparagraphs were culula-
tive, thus making it necessary for applicant to have both a pharmacy degree
from a qualified school and the required hours of experience."
14
TAxATION. Charitable Purpose Exemption-Summary Judgment. The
plaintiff seeks to enjoin the assessment and collection of taxes upon its
property on the theory that the property was being used exclusively for
charitable purposes and the defendants presented a deposition and affidavit
to dispute this contention. It was held that this material did not provide
sufficient information as to the property's use to sustain the chancellor's
findings against the plaintiff's right of injunction; hence, there were genuine
issues of material fact to be tried."15
Payment of Delinquent Taxes-Reacquired Land. The plaintiff paid
delinquent taxes in 1941 and bought back his parcel of land previously
lost to the state for nonpayment of taxes. He was therefore entitled in
an action in ejectment to contest the sufficiency of the defense of adverse
possession raised by the defendants who occupied this land adversely, without
color of title, from 1941 to 1945."1
Sales Tax Exemptions-"Dealers." The appellant operated an iron
works and furnished and installed materials for the improvement of real
property on a cost plus basis. The court held he was a "dealer" within the
comptroller's rule eliminating from exemption from sales taxes contracts
by. which the contractor acts as a "dealer" selling tangible personalty. The
appellant was therefore subject to a sales tax.117
Tax Lien-Strength of Title. Under the statutes in force at the time
the county obtained its quiet title decree and the drainage district obtained
its foreclosure decree, the county converted its tax lien into a title which
was taken in recognition of the outstanding delinquent drainage district
liens, but which was not subject to enforcement of the liens in an action
against the county itself. Thus, the enforcement of the drainage district
liens was placed in a state of suspension until the county disposed of the
title, whereupon the drainage district could then enforce its liens against
the purchaser. However, the purchaser from the drainage district would
113. FLA. STAT. § 465.071 (1955).
114. Baker v. Morrison, 86 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1956).
115. Fellowship Foundation v. Paul, 86 So.2d 808 (1ia. 1956).
116. Gates v. Roberts, 85 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1956).
117. Harvey v. Green, 85 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1956).
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not be entitled to prevail in ejectment against the purchaser from the
county. 18
WILLS AND TRUSTS. Bank Deposit Trust-Presumption on Death of
Depositor. Where a depositor made a bank deposit in her own name in
trust for her son and took no steps during her lifetime to revoke the Totten
trust,"0 the presumption arose that an absolute trust was created as to the
balance on hand at the death of the depositor. Thus the son, and not the
administrator, was entitled to the proceeds of the deposit upon his mother's
death.'2 0
Cancellation of Itstrument-Mistake in Inducement. An action was
brought by beneficiaries under the original will to set aside an amended
will on the grounds that the decedent was induced by mistake of fact to
execute the second instrument. It was held that the statute' 2' granting
relief when wills are secured by fraud, duress, mistake or undue influence
does not relate to mistakes in inducement.'
Killing Decedent-Bar to Inheritance. The statute' 23 declaring that any
person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled to
inherit from the decedent was not applicable as a bar where the widow was
acquitted, on grounds of insanity, of murdering her husband. It was further
held that if the statute was not applicable to dower rights the common
law did not provide for the forfeiture of the wife's dower rights, whether
the killing was lawful or unlawful.
24
WORKMENS COMsPENSATION. Carrier's Rights to Adjudicate Degree of
Disability. Where the compensation carrier had completed payment to
claimant of compensation for 10% permanent partial disability of her hand
and had filed with the commission a final settlement report with respect
to the claim, and no claim for further compensation had been filed, the
carrier would not be entitled to a hearing to obtain an adjudication as to
the degree of the claimant's permanent partial disability.12a
Carrier's Right of Set-off. A \Vorkmen's Compensation insurance car-
rier was not entitled to set-off the amount of compensation paid under an
award for permanent partial disability against the amount of temporary
total disability compensation awarded the employee because the decrease
in disability occurred after the period for which permanent disability com-
pensation was awarded. An overpayment arises only when an award dc-
118. Kostecos v. Johnson, 85 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1956).
119. In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E.748 (1904).
120. Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So.2d 726 (Fa. 1956).
121. FLA. STAT. § 731.08 (1955).
122. Forsythe v. Spielberger, 86 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1956).
123. FLA. STAT. § 731.31 (1955).
124. Jill v. Morris, 85 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1956).
125. Miami Beach.First National Bank v. Dunn, 85 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1956).
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creasing the compensation rate is made effective from the date of the
injury ."
Carrier's Obligation to Pay Attorney's Fees. In a proceeding to review
an order of the Industrial Commission awarding fees to the claimant's
attorneys for representing the claimants before the commission, where the
insurance carrier admitted the claim liability but contended that the investi-
gation and determination of the lawful beneficiary was the commission's
function and that the burden of attorney's fees should not be placed upon
the carrier, it was held that the successful claimants were entitled to an
award of attorney's fees, where the carrier had failed to comply with the
requirements of the act so as to avoid its obligation to pay the claim.'
27
Course of Employment. The claimant, who was leaving the lobby
of a hotel during his attendance at a convention, sustained a cerebral vascular
accident from an alleged fall. It was held that he was engaged in the pursuit
of his own private affairs and his injury was not sustained in the "course
of the employment.'1
28
Insurer's Liability. When the employer's insurance carrier insures the
payment of benefits by the employer, the carrier must pay whatever judg-
ments are lawfully rendered against the employer.' 29
Statute of Limitations-Minors not Bound. A claim of minors for
compensation for the death of their father, though not filed until more
than two years after the death of the father, was not barred by the two-year
limitation. The minors could not be bound by the failure of their mother
to pursue a remedy made available by law for the benefit of the minors.'"'
Timely Filing-Application for Review. An application for review of
the Deputy Commissioner's order awarding compensation was filed with
the full Industrial Commission at Tallahassee 21 days after the entry of
the order instead of within the 20 days allowed by the Act.' 3' The applica-
tion was not timely, even though it was filed with the Deputy Commis-
sioncr within the 20-day period."i 2
Total Disability-Blindness. The employee had lost one eye in the
service of another employer and subsequently lost the remaining eye in the
service of the instant employer. The court held that he sustained total
blindness in the service of the instant employer which constituted total
disability compensable for 700 weeks rather than for 175 weeks for loss
of one eye."'1
126. Smitty's Coffee Shop v. Florida Industrial Commission, 86 So.2d 268 (Fla.
1956).
127. Great American Indemnity Company v. Williams, 85 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1956).
128. Foxworth v. Florida Industrial Commission, 86 So.Zd 147 (Fla. 1956).
129. Lyng v. Rao, 87 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1956).
130. Bailey's Auto Service v. Mitchell, 85 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1956).
131. FLA. STAT. § 440.25 (4) (a) (1955).
132. Foumigault v. Jackson Memorial Hospital, 87 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1956).
133. Alexander v. Peoples Ice Co., 85 So.2d 846 (Fla. 1956).
